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In his final original book, Battling to the End, Girard could hardly have been clearer:“Violence” he wrote, “can no longer be checked. From this point of 
view we can say that the apocalypse has begun.”1 (Girard, 2010, p. 210)
Faced with the rise of global Islamist terror and the declaration of a ‘war 
against terror’ Girard observed the collapse of politics as a mechanism to con-
tain violence. History is not inevitably and dialectically converging on a rational 
Hegelian Aufhebung but has the pattern of a duel, as observed by the Prussian 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz after the defeat of the Prussian army by 
Napoleon’s revolutionary French army at Jena. Far from converging on recon-
ciliation, the logic of mimetic rivalry predicts escalation to the extremes. For 
Girard, the intellectual task was to follow von Clausewitz’s insight to its logical 
conclusion (to ‘complete Clausewitz’ as the French title of his book demands), 
a path from which even the Prussian theorist himself had shrunk:
“In a more realistic manner than Hegel, Clausewitz showed the utter 
powerlessness of politics against the escalation to extremes. Ideological wars, 
msu-contagion27-all.indd   15 4/29/20   2:24 PM
16 Duncan John Morrow
monstrous justifications of violence, have led humanity to the stage beyond war 
where we are today.” (Girard, Battling, 209– 10)
By focussing on the implications of globalisation, Girard in one sense con-
curs with business writer and commentator Thomas Friedman who pronounced 
in 2005 that ‘the world is flat’2 (Friedman, 2005). 500  years after Columbus, 
Friedman points out that political, historic and geographical differences were 
less and less decisive in a unitary global economy where all competitors increas-
ingly operated on the same rules. Furthermore, mimetic change is taking place in 
multiple locations: the end of the Cold War, the spread of digital technology, 
the breaking down of international barriers through the availability of infor-
mation, the sharing of work across all physical boundaries through file sharing 
(uploading), the creation of global supply chains and the ability to collaborate 
through constant communication. Accordingly, no ‘state’ is now bigger than the 
market and all workers are increasingly direct competitors. The rise of social 
media and the internet has only further turbo- charged Friedman’s drift. Things 
which once separated— including physical distance, time, size and scale, public 
and private— have progressively become blurred, if not indistinguishable.
Optimistically, Friedman asserted that the world was now held together 
by the rational self- interest of what he dubbed ‘the Dell theory of conflict reso-
lution’ in which no two countries that are part of a major global supply chain 
(like Dell) will ever fight a war against each other (Friedman, 421). In contrast, 
Girard emphasised escalating mimesis of desire as the defining characteristic of 
globalised human relations and identified instead the potential implications 
of the elimination of remaining cultural differences as human living together 
in a world of unrestricted global mimetic rivalry. The phenomenon of global 
rivalry is also echoed by Pankraj Mishra who has charted the mimetic unity of 
seemingly disparate phenomena spreading from Europe into the smallest cor-
ner of the global system3 (Mishra, 2017). Political and social aspiration leading 
to frustration have turned politically toxic. Radical identities have emerged in 
post- colonial societies fundamentally shaped by their oppositional relationship 
to their opponent.
For Girard, violence in human affairs does not arise from essential differ-
ence but from escalating rivalry over the same objects, and from the consequent 
elimination of differences. Girard disputes Samuel Huntington’s thesis that the 
underlying dynamic of global warfare is cultural difference leading to a ‘clash of 
civilizations’4 Instead he roots the political crisis in the rapid erasure of many 
of the cultural separations and differences. In a world without boundaries all 
distinction between inside and outside collapses. The process broadly described 
as ‘globalisation’ has now reached the point where no culture is closed, and 
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therefore no person outside the mimetic influences of the wider world. In the 
absence of restraining cultural limits, efforts to assert differences paradoxically 
both escalate and disappear in mimesis of desire for the same object and an 
escalating frenzy of reciprocity and, eventually, violence. The resulting ‘crisis of 
undifferentiation’ renders all cultural mechanisms, including politics, ineffec-
tive in restraining the mimetic forces released.
The ‘long road to global flatness’ which Friedman identifies is, in Girard’s 
view, largely a consequence of the revelation of the innocence of the scapegoat 
in the New Testament and its mediation in western society and around the 
globe through Christianity. The gradual unfolding of this revelation has dis-
solved the distinctions on which culture is based, above all disabling the funda-
mental claim to use ‘good violence’ to protect against ‘bad violence’. In a ‘crisis 
of undifferentiation’ cultural mechanisms including politics are ineffective in 
restraining the mimetic forces released.
Both Paul Dumouchel and Wolfgang Palaver have examined the way in 
which these insights have emerged in modern politics. Dumouchel explores 
how traditional cultures protected themselves against internal violence by dis-
counting violence externally (against those in the ‘third circle’) and through 
the strict regulation of internal obligation, generating what he calls the ‘space 
of solidarity and hostility’, in which the two are intimately linked. By extend-
ing the concept of neighbour beyond kinship groups, Christianity enabled the 
establishment of a civic sphere of equality under the modern state. At the same 
time, however, the existence of civic equality also had the effect of loosening 
the bonds of tradition and kinship.
The modern state replaces sacred kinship obligations with the exercise of the 
monopoly of violence within a given territory with clear boundaries. Inside 
the boundaries, the overarching principles are the twin concepts of rational-
ity and equality. A modern territory is “a hybrid space of physical space and 
moral predispositions. A territory means the establishment of moral relation-
ships, relationships of political hostility and friendship, not in function of 
kinship, lineage, membership of a given order or social status but by borders 
set in physical space.”5 Without territory the state (the space of the monopoly 
of violence and hence of rationality and equality) has no clear meaning. Until 
World War I, however, western states were able to establish internal boundaries 
while maintaining a distinction between the metropolitan area in Europe where 
the rule of law applied and its colonies outside where acts of violence unaccept-
able within the core state were formally legitimated in what Giorgio Agamben 
has called ‘the state of exception’6. After the short interlude of the Cold War, this 
is precisely what has disappeared in globalisation.
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Agamben drew on the work of the German jurist and political philosopher 
Carl Schmitt whose reputation was tarnished for many years as a result of his 
membership of the Nazi Party in the 1930s. Famously, Schmitt defined the 
essence of the political as the distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’. Peace and 
law are based on ‘spatial enclosures’ (“Hegungen im räumlichen Sinne”)7. For 
Schmitt, the greatest threat to peace was the dissolution of the state in internal 
chaos, a threat which he saw as inherent within the global pretentions of liberal-
ism. Drawing from Hobbes, Schmitt saw the achievement of the Leviathan as 
‘one monster holding down all the other monsters’, preventing civil war through 
an internal monopoly of legitimate violence: “Security exists only in the state. 
Extra civitatem nulla securitas. The state absorbs all rationality and all legality. 
Everything outside of the state is therefore a ‘state of nature.’”8
Both Dumouchel and Wolfgang Palaver revisit Schmitt’s work as the clear-
est articulation of the territorial principle in political order. As Wolfgang Palaver 
comments: “In order to overcome the state of nature, this chaotic and warlike 
condition has to be transferred from the inside of the state to its outside, to 
its relationship with other states.”9 The intentional embrace of ‘official’ external 
enemies is a political necessity to contain the greater risk of internal collapse. 
Although superficially drawing on Christianity as the transcendent internal 
principle of western society, Wolfgang Palaver shows conclusively that Schmitt’s 
‘Christianity’ is dependent on his understanding of the concept of the church 
as katechon, an ambivalent institution relying on violence to hold back greater 
violence. For Schmitt, the point was to ‘de- anarchise’ Christianity and to render 
the effect of Christ harmless in the social and political sphere, as both Hobbes 
and Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor had already suggested.
In practice, however, the drift toward de- territorialisation has only been 
interrupted and never arrested since World War  I. Woodrow Wilson’s efforts 
to redesign European Empires on the principle of territorial nationalism col-
lapsed into a nightmare of arbitrary violence exercised on an ethnic, racial and 
ideological grounds in the 1930s and 40s10. Since then it has been seen to fail 
with dramatic consequences in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and the 
Middle East. The postwar withdrawal of European states from Africa and Asia 
both removed the existence of a state of exception for European states and set 
off struggles to impose a monopoly of violence in a context of significant inter-
nal divisions and ideological polarization with powerful echoes of European 
experience (Mishra, 2017). When the end of the Cold War removed the binary 
principle of postwar global politics the era of globalization arrived. As Paul 
Dumouchel observed:
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We no longer have the territorial order, a continuous isotropic space of which each 
part is external to each other . . . The extent of these secure spaces is not determined 
by international agreements, but by the relation of power between adversaries. 
In fact the protection, fortified walls innumerable identity checks, and biometric 
security are there because borders have ceased playing a role. “Foes” cannot be 
recognized on the basis of their passport alone . . . Territory’s disappearance goes 
hand in hand with the disappearance of equality and the rule of law, features of 
the territorial order. The ‘others’, the ‘foes’ are different from us, and they are not 
always reasonable. There is thus no reason for us to give them the protection of the 
law, which they are ready to break . . . Now that the enemies are among us, hidden 
everywhere and anywhere, they can be anyone . . . (Dumouchel, 166– 67)
One of the most obvious consequences is that the decline in inter- state warfare 
has been accompanied by the rise of internal war and so called ‘failed states’ 
together with the growth of nebulous and non- territorial foes in terrorism and 
the security state. The field is now open, as John- Pierre Dupuy argues, to a 
global form of mimetic rivalry:
Resentment unites the very actors who mutually excommunicate each other. It is 
now on a planetary scale that the game of mimetic rivalry will play itself out, a game 
that binds the rivals all the more compulsively and tightly together even as they 
claim to have nothing in common. The image that appears to emerge— in place of 
the ‘clash of civilisations’ slogan invoked by those who do not understand the state 
of the world— is that of a civil war within a single global civilization, which has 
come into being kicking and screaming.11
BREXIT IN THE CRISIS OF UNDIFFERENTIATION
Since the referendum in the United Kingdom on whether to remain or leave the 
European Union in June 2016, it has become ever clearer that previous presump-
tions about stability and continuity in the UK may no longer be reliable. Brexit 
may be understood as a secondary symptom in the wider crisis of rising mimetic 
anxiety and its impact on politics, but the spread of radical political uncertainty 
into the UK and USA, the core of the postwar Western political order, suggests 
that no part of the global system is immune in a broader crisis of undifferentia-
tion. A political and constitutional system that was once assumed to be a model 
of stability and held up as a successful and early example of the peaceful ‘end of 
history’ has become an arena of immobility, political polarisation, increasingly 
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violent rhetoric and a tangible anxiety that the system itself may not survive the 
internal enmities unleashed.
The campaign to leave the EU in the UK spoke seamlessly to powerful 
residual fears about fading British distinctiveness, amplifying long- evident anx-
ieties and divisions about the decline of British identity and prestige. Uniquely 
in Europe, the second world war was interpreted, in retrospect at least, as a 
national triumph— indeed as THE heroic struggle of British history. But it was 
also rather obviously a watershed, where everything that followed was marked 
by loss of political prestige, accelerated by the deep and unmistakable fear of 
loss of any semblance of economic autonomy in the European Union and in the 
face of globalisation. The collapse of the global banking economy in 2009 made 
visible the existence, predicament and resentment of a largely white and often 
male poor: the core of the heroic generation of 1945 was now without kinship 
ties of hostility and solidarity. As Paul Dumouchel comments: “Indifference 
to the outcasts of exchange who are responsible for their own misfortune and to 
whom no one owes anything, is the everyday ordinary form of the banality of 
evil” (Dumouchel, 139)
In this context, the European Union increasingly came to play the role 
of external other for one part of the population. European integration was iden-
tified as the primary source of humiliation, and at the hands of the wartime 
enemy. A ‘Europe’ that was never ‘us’ now became the resented ‘other’ instead 
of a solution in the face of retreat from Empire and the special relationship 
with the USA. Britain in this narrative was always at risk of being a second- 
class participant in a Franco- German project. Resentment, especially against 
immigration, even where it was not immediately visible but especially where 
it was perceived to have been enabled or encouraged in the European Union, 
became a convenient focus. But it was also striking that those campaigning for 
remaining in the European Union seemed unable to make any compelling case 
for a European project, relying entirely on pragmatic necessity to persuade.
But the most striking aspect of living ‘in Brexit’ has been the speed with 
which a specific question about the European Union in 2016 escalated into 
a crisis about everything by 2019. Both during and after the referendum, the 
evidence of an escalating mimetic crisis spread everywhere and the absence of 
the ability of the political system to mediate and channel those resentments was 
increasingly obvious. A division only slightly more than 50– 50 was further com-
plicated by geographic, and national- political variation. A referendum about 
restoring the ‘sovereignty of parliament’ itself created havoc about whether 
the referendum result or a parliamentary majority was sovereign. A campaign 
designed to ‘take back control’ from an external power increasingly became a 
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knife- edge battle for control between internal rivals. Cosmopolitanism, itself a 
proxy for political and economic resentments over regional and class disputes, 
became a target. The Prime Minister defined the battle to deliver Brexit as one 
between the people ‘from somewhere’ and others ‘from nowhere’. Reports of 
targeted hate crime attacks on identified minorities rose measurably. Amidst 
accusations against ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘saboteurs,’ the rhetoric of 
politics increasingly reflected the language of ‘friend and foe.’ Legislation on 
all but the most urgent other matters came to a halt. Very different results in 
distinct parts of the UK, notably Scotland, reopened political rivalries about 
independence and the future of the UK state. In Northern Ireland, rivalries over 
the border threatened to reopen old wounds. Economic rivalries, generational 
rivalries and resentments about rapid immigration and anxieties about sexual-
ity and gender interacted with fears about minorities, and Muslims in particular 
and all increasingly wrapped in a single crisis of undifferentiation, without any 
clear mechanism for resolution.
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE CRISIS OF THE POLITICAL
The spread of global uncertainty now appears to includes states previously 
regarded as impervious to systemic crisis. Critically, for Girard, the origin of 
the process is not cultural difference but the loss of distinctiveness leading to 
escalated mimetic rivalry:
The error is always to reason within categories of “difference” when the root of all 
conflicts is rather “competition,” mimetic rivalry between persons, countries, cul-
tures. Competition is the desire to imitate the other in order to obtain the same 
thing he or she has, by violence if need be. No doubt terrorism is bound to a world 
“different” from ours, but what gives rise to terrorism does not lie in that “difference” 
that removes it further from us and makes it inconceivable to us. To the contrary, it 
lies in an exacerbated desire for convergence and resemblance. Human relations are 
essentially relations of imitation, of rivalry.12
For Girard, events like Brexit are not so much the ‘cause’ of undifferentiation 
as a ‘scene.’ The erosion of cultural difference is not so much political as funda-
mentally anthropological.
In this context, geopolitical accident ironically also makes Northern Ireland 
a sobering place from which to observe mimetic processes.
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Northern Ireland’s exceptionalism has a number of aspects. Until recently, 
it was been regarded in western capitals as endemically unstable and managed 
as a particular kind of ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) since 1920. Endemic 
conflict in Northern Ireland was treated as an ‘atypical’, ‘deviant’ and abnormal’ 
special case in English- speaking democracy. Secondly, and as an unintended 
consequence of this exceptionalism, its small size allowed its escalation to the 
extremes to be limited through the ultimately overwhelming force of the United 
Kingdom state. Thirdly, within the Brexit ‘Russian doll’, Northern Ireland has 
taken on a particular prominence triggered by the impact of British withdrawal 
from the EU on the unusual inter- national constitutional and border arrange-
ments which were the central element of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement 
(1998).
Northern Ireland was carved out of the rest of Ireland in 1920 in a last- ditch 
effort at a territorial solution in Paul Dumouchel’s sense of “the establishment 
of . . . relationships of political hostility and friendship, not in function of kin-
ship, lineage, membership in a given order or social status, in other words, not 
by person- to- person ties but by borders set in physical space.” (Dumouchel, 
70) Carl Schmitt reveals the division between ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ as the essential 
core of the political (Schmitt, 2007). The border in Ireland utterly failed to make 
this separation. Instead the new border incorporated a substantial minority of 
Irish Catholics on the ‘wrong’ side of the frontier, refusing legitimacy to the 
new Northern Ireland state, both preventing the establishment of a monopoly 
of violence and any capacity to define friend and foe on the basis of interna-
tional frontiers.
Lacking a secure ‘space of hostility and solidarity’, Northern Ireland ‘con-
tained’ political and ethnic competition in both senses of containment. But 
if the border did not neatly separate friend from foe, the unanticipated ben-
efit for the rest of the UK and Ireland was that it neatly separated the ‘areas of 
monopoly’ from their most complicated ‘state of exception.’ The territory that 
became Northern Ireland separated the area of greatest mimetic pressure and 
closest similarity from the rest of the UK and Ireland, creating and containing 
an explosive and never ending rivalry between parties that were less volun-
tary associations than ‘groups to which people belonged from birth to death’ 
(Dumouchel, 74).
Unusually, however, the combination of its small size, isolated location and 
separate institutions allowed the potentially violent implications of its relation-
ships to be held ‘at arms- length’, quarantined as a unique ‘exception’ from the 
rest of both UK and Ireland. Safe on the western side of Europe, the UK feared 
no external rival. Northern Ireland became a repelling ‘mimetic black hole’ 
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rather than an attracting object of desire between Britain and Ireland. North-
ern Ireland’s existence created a spatial barrier between the UK and Ireland 
interrupting the temporal continuity of their own quarrel. Rather than ‘a place 
between’, Northern Ireland was now ‘a place apart’13
Steps by the local government to impose a monopoly of violence in fact 
institutionalised ‘friend’ and foe’ relationships (defined locally as ‘sectarian-
ism’) in all aspects of society. Suspicion, alienation and sporadic violence were 
‘normal’ rather than ‘exceptional’. As Dumouchel predicts, suspicion was, for its 
victims, entirely rational. But for as long as violence was invisible, responsibility 
for, and even the existence of, violence could be publicly denied even if its ghost 
was ever- present. Languishing in an endless but limited cycle of revenge, UK 
and Ireland contented themselves that Northern Ireland’s apparently endemic 
polarisation was backward, locally- generated and exotic rather than the conse-
quence of shared and unresolved historic rivalry.
In the late 1960s, when violence escalated, it was the speed that took almost 
everyone by surprise. Indeed it looked at first as though escalation was unstop-
pable. Carrying residual responsibility for maintaining order, the United King-
dom deployed troops on the streets in 1969. Trained for deployment in war or 
in colonial contexts at far distance from citizen- view, the British army was now 
under the scrutiny of nightly TV cameras. A force designed for deployment 
against ‘external’ foes was deployed in an ‘internal’ context, and was unable 
to extricate itself for over 30  years. Deployment of the army underlined the 
ambiguous position of Northern Ireland in the UK as the ‘internal external’ of 
the state.
The British dilemma was obvious: establishing a monopoly of violence 
indicated an escalating use of force to one side, but an escalation of force 
exposed the complicity of the state in violence and equally undermined any 
residual legitimacy. Drawn into the middle of an armed and arming society and 
enforcing emergency law, the army struggled to maintain the distinctiveness 
between law and violence. The collapse of legitimacy had fatally undermined 
the state’s claim to monopoly on violence, without creating any alternative. 
As Benoit Chantre makes clear, only a monopoly “has the luxury of striking at 
the heart of violence, of punishing the guilty party without being afraid that the 
punishment will have harmful consequences for the whole group.” (Chantre, 
2018, p. 99)
The UK found itself caught between treating Northern Ireland as an exter-
nal case of extra- territorial insurgency (friend and foe) and an internal territory 
where the rule of law applied.
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Both the use of force and the absence of force by the state could potentially 
escalate a mimetic vortex in Northern Ireland. An external ‘foe’ was simulta-
neously an internal ‘friend’. Instead of excluding the guilty party, law was at risk 
of escalating the rivalr. On the one side, all efforts to impose a political peace 
based on distinguishing between ‘friend of foe’ eroded rather than reinforce any 
moral differences between the state and its competitors, stoking violence and 
creating victims. On the other, arm’s-length management still left the failure 
of the UK state to protect its citizens visible. Reluctantly, the British govern-
ment concluded that it could no longer manage indirectly but must take direct 
responsibility for enforcement and at the same time limiting the nature of 
state response by modifying emergency law and removing political power from 
the local partisan government (Unionists). As Chantre remarks, the transcen-
dence of justice turned out to be very precarious.14
By changing the balance of power, direct ‘management’ of Northern Ireland 
eventually served to slow down the escalation and reach of terrorism, but at 
the cost of attenuating violent conflict over decades, a process which inevitably 
made both violence and the suffering of victims on all sides the consistent vis-
ible reality and drew in both state and non- state into its single narrative. Above 
all, however, the crisis of undifferentiation between bad violence and good 
violence was unresolved and embedded in political and social relationships.
But for a post- war western state in the middle of the Vietnam crisis, vis-
ible participation in extra- legal killing of unarmed citizens, failure to prevent 
ethnic cleansing and enacting emergency law on its own territory undermined 
not only the legitimacy of the UK state but of the entire western human rights 
project by extending the crisis of undifferentiation and exposing the cultural 
origins of the state in violence. Caught between designating an internal enemy 
and failing to do so, the informal state goal in Northern Ireland was no longer 
a monopoly but an ‘acceptable level’ of violence, managing residential space to 
ensure separation and seeking new local political solution. In the shadow of the 
holocaust and the midst of the Cold War, Northern Ireland stood as an embar-
rassing indictment in the West but the escalation to the extremes, always latent, 
never fully emerged.
Ultimately the persistent visibility of violence and the weakness of the state 
drove Britain and Ireland into a new approach to restore monopoly. Northern 
Ireland became the chance beneficiary of a highly unusual set of circumstances 
for old enemies: structured mimetic distance between Northern Ireland and 
its surrounding territories over decades, opportunities of co- operation within a 
European framework that allowed both parties to recalibrate embedded pattern 
of post- colonial rivalries and the profound sensitivity of all western states to the 
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revelation of complicity with violence. Faced with an apparently limitless and 
self- perpetuating spiral of revenge, UK stumbled after 15 years into a historically 
unprecedented political partnership with Ireland, as the only remaining avenue 
to establish sufficient legitimacy to exclude competitor violence in Northern 
Ireland. Supported by both the US and EU (the whole world), Britain and Ireland 
became more or less enthusiastic allies, devising, negotiating and managing 
a complex constitutional framework in a shared ‘problem child’ (third party) 
to promote ‘reconciliation.’ Above all, the shared unexpected appearance of a 
shared British- Irish framework for legitimacy held out the promise that vio-
lence outside that legitimacy could be identified and isolated.
The 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement drew on all of the unique 
circumstances of Northern Ireland to recalibrate a 25- year revenge cycle. To 
address the friend and foe politics which had predominated until then and 
shaped the identity of Britain and Ireland, both states agreed that everyone in 
Northern Ireland could in perpetuity self- identify as citizens of either state, or 
both, and would be treated with full citizen equality. In redrawing the ‘space 
of hostility and solidarity’ in Northern Ireland they created a new form of ter-
ritoriality where British sovereignty was encapsulated within a new ‘shared’ 
project in which citizens of both British and Irish people were to be treated 
with formal equality. The sovereign state itself was explicitly subordinate to 
international human rights law. After 30  years of killing, shared membership 
of the European Union (implicitly) and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (explicitly) created the transcendent context for ‘reconciliation’ without 
explicit retreat from the Westphalian principle of territoriality.
However, lucidity about reconciliation in the British and Irish governments 
remained rooted in the ‘state of exception’. Northern Ireland was ‘elsewhere’, 
where compromises over justice could be contemplated. It was important to 
connect these concessions, including territoriality and citizenship arrange-
ments, to ‘the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland.’ Reconciliation was 
primarily conceived as a matter for those inside Northern Ireland.
But here, ‘reconciliation’ had to be squared with the determination NOT to 
be treated as special. The compromise was to make reconciliation ‘aspirational’ (in 
the future), to bring active violence to an end (present) and to rely on self- 
interest and working together as the bridge.
The most vulnerable point for the hoped- for rational consensus lay in the 
mimetic legacy of violence which continued to demand revenge (euphemisti-
cally acknowledged as ‘the past’). The parties sharing government remained 
existentially committed to maintaining the primary responsibility of the other. 
All sides allergically rejected ‘equivalence.’ Yet in a profound sense this was their 
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greatest similarity. Political identity required the maintenance of the boundary 
between good and bad violence, and thus between friend and foe. Given the 
widespread use of ‘state of exception’ methods, this was not only a question 
for ‘terrorists’ but also a question for governments. But to the growing con-
sternation of the state apparatus and its supporters, international human rights 
law designed to judge Nazism and Communism meant that British (or Irish) 
violence could be brought to court with greater certainty of success and greater 
international judicial weight than that of non- state ‘terrorist’ antagonists.
Nobody was prepared to renounce their own part, without first denounc-
ing the primary responsibility of the other. Nobody conceded that killing was 
a responsibility shared in a mutual mimetic relationship. At the same time, any 
process in relation to ‘crimes’ committed under the conditions of the unusu-
ally long state of exception which was not controlled by an internal party 
would inevitably point to that which all parties wished to avoid: the elimina-
tion of most of the differences between warring parties and between law and 
crime— equivalence, aka undifferentiation.
In the absence of anyone asking for or seeking to be forgiven as a prelude 
to restored relationships, the practical political consensus was that truth- telling 
would be avoided where it would threaten the internal mythical narrative of the 
group. Differentiation would be maintained as unresolved: you keep your 
truth about who was responsible for murder, and I will keep mine. Formal truth- 
 telling, acknowledgement or forgiveness could not be enforced and would 
actually rekindle mimetic antagonism, threatening the limited political achieve-
ment of capping the level of physical violence. Consequentially, political rivalry 
shifted to control over the legal truth- telling mechanism itself, and political rela-
tionships remained mimetically bound to the myths of the past. The primary 
value of victims was in their capacity to expose the narrative of the other, but 
there was little hope of their vindication in the face of the perpetrator. Both 
revenge and reconciliation were unfulfilled.
Reconciliation could not be enforced, even as it was clear that all real 
change depended on it. Political effort was rededicated, perhaps inevitably, to 
the old goal— containment and maintaining ‘the peace’ in the face of the unre-
solved mimetic antagonism and the resentment it continued to foster. Political 
wisdom directed that reconciliation would be accommodated to the limits of 
politics in Northern Ireland rather than vice versa. Political success depended 
on defining a space within which mimetic resentment could continue unhin-
dered without destroying the system.
The hope was that the absence of violence could be secured by rational 
political self- interest and financial incentive. But the peace now depended on 
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the capacity of the UK and Ireland to assure some monopoly of legitimacy 
by supporting the system. As time passed, the absence of immediate threat 
resulted in increasing neglect. When economic disruption distracted the atten-
tion of both Dublin and London, there was visible impatience with the failure 
of Northern Ireland to resolve its internal crisis and no appetite to do more than 
prop up what remained of the system and maintaining mimetic distance.
The pattern that emerged was of endless mini- crises. Mimetic re- escalation 
was triggered by issues defined as friend- or foe in Northern Ireland and internal 
political stability collapsed. Stability could only be re- established by reluctant 
inter- governmental arbitration. Uninterested in responsibility to engage unre-
solved mimetic resentment and determined to avoid direct responsibility, the 
primary and shared political goal of all parties was to prevent internal weakness 
becoming an externally visible crisis. Under the mantra ‘better than before’, all 
politicians agreed that the benefits of arms- length emergency management of 
an unstable political peace outweighed both the prior mimetic crisis and the 
risks of taking direct responsibility.
The Brexit referendum took place without serious attention to Northern 
Ireland in the UK. Seeking to act supportively, concern in Dublin was voiced 
quietly. However, the peace in Northern Ireland had been constructed to deny 
the scale of the risk and to obscure and deflect any responsibility for it from all 
actors. However unwittingly, the unilateral decision to leave the EU automati-
cally put the monopoly by which violence had been contained at risk, setting in 
train a renewed rivalry over Northern Ireland, now entangled with an internal 
British polarisation and a wider European crisis over Brexit. With direct EU 
engagement as a negotiating party in Brexit, the previous mimetic ‘distance’ of 
Northern Ireland from global affairs was significantly reduced. If international 
consensus was replaced by national egotism as the centre of sovereignty, the 
brakes on mimetic escalation were removed. In the absence of a British- Irish 
model, Northern Ireland was confronted with the limits of politics as a cultural 
mechanism for peace.
UNDIFFERENTIATION
The Brexit experience, and the place of Northern Ireland within it, provide vis-
ible evidence for Girard’s contention that conflicts in the modern world both 
arise in undifferentiation and accelerate the process of undifferentiation. The 
weakening of state authority in the context of globalisation results not so much 
from increasing difference, but from closer mimesis with that ‘difference,’ and 
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therefore increasing similarity. In a world where the sacred nature of difference 
no longer applies, ‘difference’ is increasingly fetishized. In the absence of firm 
boundaries, the potential for unrestrained mimetic rivalry and the replacement 
of external conflict (wars) with internal crisis has escalated to include states 
which were previously regarded as impervious to systemic crisis.
The additional contribution of Girard and what might be called the ‘Girard-
ian school’ in recent years has been to draw attention to the central contribution 
of Christianity in the unmasking of the scapegoat mechanism. The central nar-
rative of the innocence of the victim at its core has acted to reveal both the 
violence underpinning cultural order and disarming the capacity of cultural 
mechanisms to establish and maintain order:
The true engine of progress is the slow decomposition of the closed worlds rooted 
in victim mechanisms. This is the force that destroyed archaic societies and hence-
forth dismantles the ones replacing them, the nations we call ‘modern’.15
By placing the crucifixion and resurrection at the central theme of social 
cohesion, Christianity after Constantine was always ambivalent, both 
upholding cultural order and simultaneously dissolving its sacred claims by 
disabling all further efforts to sacralise violence through scapegoating. As 
Benoît Chantre points out, it is the cross “which reveals the secret of the 
founding murder, makes it possible to know that flagrant injustice exists, but 
also to ‘realise that this man’s hideous torture was the price of our existence.’” 
(Chantre, 93)
For some political thinkers, including Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss and Eric 
Voegelin, the Christian revelation was not so much a cause for celebration as 
for profound alarm. Common to them all is a visible anxiety, that the disabling 
of the Hobbesian Leviathan at the heart of the state would remove the primary 
vehicle through which violence was controlled.
Schmitt’s intellectual efforts accepted that institutional ‘Christianity,’ Prot-
estant or Catholic, should be at the core of internal social order in the west but 
stripped of its ‘anarchistic’ potential:
“Hobbes articulated and provided scientific reason for what the Grand Inquisitor 
did: to make the effect of Christ harmless in the social and political sphere; to 
de- anarchise Christianity but to leave to it at the same time some kind of legiti-
mating effect in the background and in any case not to do without it.” (Schmitt, 
Glossarium, 243)
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Wolfgang Palaver shows that Schmitt’s understanding of the fundamental cat-
egories of politics as ‘friend or foe’ was driven less by support for authoritarian 
nationalism than by fear that the alternative to an external enemy was a civil war 
in a single world state. Within this framework, Schmitt
longed for a pagan version of Christianity to protect the political offspring of the 
old sacred from its complete dissolution. This rather futile attempt is linked to his 
endorsement of the katechon, a biblical concept that he interprets as a restrainer 
against the death of cultures by keeping political friend- enemy patterns alive. (Palaver,  
“Carl Schmitt’s ‘Apocalyptic’ Resistance,” 70)
In similar vein, Leo Strauss was profoundly concerned at what he saw as the 
radicalising and destabilizing impact on modernity of Christian concepts like 
charity on the proper ordering of relationships through philosophical reason-
ing as classically articulated by Aristotle and Plato: For Strauss, the elevation of 
charity through the gospels beyond the sphere of private virtue destabilized the 
cultural order in a way he characterized as ‘extreme’:
According to the modern project, philosophy or science was no longer to be under-
stood as essentially contemplative and proud but as active and charitable; it was to 
be of service of man’s estate; it was to enable man to become the master and owner 
of nature through the intellectual conquest of nature.16
In Strauss’ view, the impulse of charity in Christianity forces philosophy to 
take reference outside itself and to subject itself to the goal of alleviating the 
suffering of humanity as a whole. However, it also increases the temptation to 
social engineering and religious persecution in society beyond the principles of 
wisdom. As John Ranieri argues, for Voegelin the wisdom and order of Athens 
was to be preferred to the dangers inherent in the egalitarianism of Jerusalem.17
If anything, Eric Voegelin encapsulates the same problem of the Christian 
revelation for politics even more clearly: “‘The Christians’ he says “were per-
secuted for a good reason; there was a revolutionary substance in Christianity 
that made it incompatible with paganism.”18 In a sense, the pagan world was 
doing what Caiaphas in John’s gospel had already recognized: the exposure of 
the innocence of the victim was fatal for cultures built on the opposite prem-
ise. What made Christianity so dangerous, according to Voegelin, was what he 
called its capacity for ‘radical de- divinisation’, reflected in Girard’s anthropology 
as ‘desacralisation.’ Voegelin saw that the idea of a universal God had a univer-
sal society as its logical corollary. But he remained highly skeptical that closed 
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societies could or should be replaced by an open society (Voegelin, The New 
Science, 158) believing that the Christian Fathers had overlooked the need for a 
civil theology.
Heightened awareness of the potentially violent consequences of the 
Christian revelation of the scapegoat mechanism is also visible in the later 
works of Girard. Girard’s enormous contribution to our understanding is to 
lay out in scientific terms both the mimetic background to the anthropological 
crisis and to reveal more clearly than before the behavioural ubiquity of scape-
goating, or resolving group violence by focussing it on an essentially random 
‘other.’ In doing so, he allows us to make sense of the underpinning drivers of 
culture ‘from the outside,’ even as we also must recognise our own participation 
in its consequences and development.
Girard resisted overly particular applications of his insights, especially 
where they appeared to privilege specific political intervention. But in Battling 
to the End, Girard wrestles directly with modern European history, particu-
larly the escalation of rivalry that led directly to the nuclear stand- off and the 
delusions underpinning progressive thought that conflict ultimately reaches a 
Hegelian Aufhebung. Instead, ‘completing Clausewitz’ means to trace the escala-
tion of mimetic violence towards ever greater extremity, a reality that the world 
has already been living through since at least 1914. The apocalypse, in both its 
proper sense of revealing the invisible and its common sense of disastrous vio-
lent implosion, is already with us. (Girard, Battling)
Above all, events underlined Girard’s insight that the path of revelation of 
the sacrificial mechanism (apocalypse) would be marked by ever more desper-
ate, if ultimately hopeless, efforts to re- establish it:
We will forever be tempted to restore the lost effectiveness of the traditional remedy 
by forever increasing the dosage, immolating more and more victims in holocausts 
that are meant to be sacrificial but that are progressively less so.19
But whereas in 1987, Girard emphasized that “to detect transcendent love- 
which remains invisible beyond the transcendent violence that stands between, 
we have to accept the idea that human violence is deceptive” (Girard, Things 
Hidden, 217) the Girard of 2010 writes more on the global nature of the mimetic 
rivalry now unleashed and the potential for ‘escalation to the extremes’ of vio-
lence which the loss of cultural structure sets loose:
On War does indeed have to be completed in order to see where it leads. The treatise 
works like a fascinating mirror of its time. In a more realistic manner than Hegel, 
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Clausewitz showed the utter powerlessness of politics against the escalation to 
extremes. Ideological wars, monstrous justifications of violence, have led humanity 
to the stage beyond war where we are today. The West is going to exhaust itself in a 
fight against Islamic terrorism, which Western arrogance has undeniably kindled . . . 
Violence can no longer be checked. From this point of view we can say that the 
apocalypse has begun. (Girard, Battling, 209– 10)
It appears that the Hegelian triumph of liberal democracy, once declared by 
Francis Fukuyama the end of history20 lasted but a moment. In the shadow 
of 9/11, the rise of global Islamist terror and the war against terror, all of this, 
including much of the Girardian literature has taken on an unmistakeable 
atmosphere of foreboding. Since then, the unprecedented Syrian refugee crisis 
in Europe, the flow of cross- Mediterranean migration and increasing evidence 
of white American angst about open borders have only multiplied the signs of 
deepening global uncertainty, as societies once regulated behind borders are 
increasingly brought into Friedman’s flat earth. Political movements explicitly 
rooted in re- establishing ‘friend and foe’ relationships based on national bound-
aries, ethnic or even racial categories have reappeared across the western world, 
many of them making claims to a specifically ‘Christian’ heritage as the basis of 
the new exclusion.
All the signs are that the presumption of Western superiority is under siege. 
Despite increasingly frantic efforts to prevent change, cultural presumptions 
built on ‘differences’ of skin colour, religion, language or cultural complexity 
dissolve into violence. And, in the face of scandal, Christianity can no longer 
stand as the centre of a righteous moral order. Rather than restoring order, the 
resort to ‘friend and foe’ escalates the crisis, precisely because it now operates in 
a world in which the internal and the external no longer mark the boundaries of 
identity. Efforts to externalise the enemy create internal chaos. It is in this 
world that Brexit and its consequences appear to be emblematic rather than 
exceptional.
THE GOSPELS IN A CRISIS OF UNDIFFERENTIATION
If Girard is correct, what does it mean that we have reached a stage beyond war, 
where violence can no longer be checked and politics is utterly powerless? With 
Schmitt, Strauss, and Voegelin, we remain haunted by the Grand Inquisitor, and 
locked in the pact with the devil required to enable human order. As Girard 
described it:
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Either you are violently opposed to violence and inevitably play its game, or you are 
not opposed to it, and it shuts your mouth. In other words, the regime of violence 
cannot be brought out into the open. (Girard, Things Hidden, 218)
Czeslaw Milosz, among others, suspected that Dostoevsky himself struggled to 
escape the circle:
the conclusion of The Brothers Karamazov allows us to doubt whether the destruc-
tive forces, which he observed, had found an effective counterweight in his mind. 
The pure youth Alyosha, at the head of his twelve schoolboys, like a boy scout troop, 
as a projection of Christian Russia capable of saving her from Revolution? That’s 
just a bit too sweet and kitschy.21
Scandalously and inexorably, however, Girard’s work, following Dostoevsky 
and in contrast to Schmitt, Strauss and Voeglin, went via Jerusalem, and above 
all through Jesus in the gospels. Even a casual reader is struck by the strangely 
parallel intensity of the political and religious background of the gospels. The 
nativity stories showcase power by contrasting Caesar Augustus’s ‘global’ and 
authoritarian census with a stable birth and invert kingship in the contrast 
between Herod’s Jerusalem and Mary’s Bethlehem. Political and religious 
intrigue is the foil of the entire text, culminating in the passion. But what is 
striking, and perhaps to ‘complete Girard’, is that the gospel’s primary concern 
is not so much to expose the crisis, let alone enter it, but to transcend it: to bring 
salvation from it.
As Girard has so often demonstrated, Jesus transcends the (already exist-
ing) mimetic crisis by speaking to its anthropological core from out of the 
middle of the prophetic tradition rather than to enter political rivalries. In 
contrast to the other Jewish parties— Sadducees, Pharisees, Zealots and even 
John the Baptist— Jesus makes no effort to ‘solve’ the crisis from ‘within itself ’ 
but points away from ‘political’ logic to what might be called after Girard 
its ‘anthropological’ or ‘human’ heart. In the face of repeated ‘friend or foe’ 
choices, Jesus proclaims a kingdom of friends. As the Jewish temple world 
implodes under Roman occupation, Jesus does not react to save its political 
authority but calls it to anti- sacrificial account. By ‘calling a halt to the game,’ 
however, he also necessarily crystallises the crisis.
Salvation in the gospel breaks from legal and cognitive certainty and 
towards mimetic security: hope and trust. In the sense of Emmanuel Levi-
nas, it is a movement from totality to the infinite22, from mimetic rivalry to 
mimetic service or, as Bergson might have it, from closed to open. In the face 
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of undifferentiation and the rise of mimetic rivalry over friend and foe that 
surrounds him Jesus’ answer is ‘follow me.’ As Girard has so decisively shown 
‘follow me’ is not a cognitive command but a mimetic invitation. It offers not an 
‘answer’ or a ‘solution’ but a direction. It is to ‘talk from walking,’ not the other 
way around. As it turns out, it is to ‘follow me’ onto the other side of violence, 
and to speak from there.
In mimesis, the pivotal choice is not to ‘follow or not’ but who to follow. 
Jesus lives out Max Scheler’s maxim that “every finite spirit believes either in a 
God or in an idol,”23 in this case the God of love or a liar from the beginning? 
( John 8:44). Mimetic freedom cannot exist outside of relationships, only in 
relationship: never freedom from mimesis, but freedom in mimesis, albeit with 
a reality outside of culture in which there is neither rivalry nor violence but gift 
and endless creation (eternal life). ‘Follow me’ means to be imaged in relation 
to our model, in this case a non- violent and loving ‘I am.’ Jesus’ response in 
the crisis of undifferentiation consuming the Jewish people in his own time is 
an invitation to metanoia to a non- violent father. As undifferentiation erodes 
cultural order, salvation is in a new mimesis outside the mimetic free for all. 
(Matt. 11:30: “For my yoke is easy and my burden is light”). Rational autonomy 
is, in this light, a secular fantasy.
The task, as John 3:17 has it, is not “to condemn the world, but to save the 
world.” The goal is not ultimately to diagnose (or understand) the problem but 
to offer a path through the sea. Jesus is not a condemnation of his own people 
but a call back to them. Jesus is not a rival but a choice. Jesus does not set out to 
break society but is present in a political and religious society already broken. 
This is not ‘counter- culture’ but ‘contrast culture.’ (N. Lohfink)24
The road to salvation necessarily passes through revelation, BOTH 
vindicating of the crucified and convicting the crucifers, an apocalypse 
made bearable only by the miracle of being forgiven and forgiving. Violence 
always understands itself in mimesis, as a reaction to a primary cause. It is always 
revenge. As a consequence, breaking the power of violence always first requires 
acknowledgement of our participation in it, and requires us to forego not only 
violence but revenge. To be in mimesis with Jesus as opposed to with political 
victimhood is always also to face responsibility and contrition and thereby to 
be freed to participate in forgiving. Condemnation is enfolded within salvation, 
and not vis a vis. Contrition is enfolded within being forgiven. Revelation is 
enfolded within following. Strength is enfolded within weakness. In psychic 
terms, resurrection presupposes crucifixion. As James Alison makes clear, the 
miracle is the revelation of the victim and the proclamation of forgiveness even 
beyond murder.25
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The anxiety that the Jesus story within Christian culture has had a corro-
sive effect on the ability of culture stems from a paradox: Jesus already acts as if 
we have reached a stage beyond war, where violence can no longer be checked 
and politics is utterly powerless. Jesus in the gospels acts to save the world by 
recalling the Jewish world unambiguously to its prophetic origins outside of cul-
ture, yet over thousands of years, the claim has been proclaimed from within an 
explicitly Christian political- cultural order which is, by definition, exposed by 
the apocalypse it proclaims. According to Leo Strauss, the Bible made the global 
vision of humanity possible by slowly undermining those closed societies based 
on a friend- enemy distinction that he preferred.26 But Christianity has always 
been driving towards the point which it also resists: that the only way out of the 
scapegoat mechanism is to first acknowledge our belonging to it. The only way 
to the scapegoat is to accept forgiveness as our participation in scapegoating is 
revealed. The road out of violence is a road which rejects the categories of ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’ as they apply to human beings and replaces them with those who are 
saved from mimetic frenzy and those who are not, those who are in mimesis 
with a god of forgiveness and love and those who are in mimesis with violence.
These categories cannot correspond to the friend and foe boundaries of any 
institution, and above all of Christianity. Within a Christian culture bounded by 
categories of friend and foe, or good and evil persons, the world is condemned 
but not saved. Christianity since Constantine has consciously functioned ‘as 
culture’ as often ‘as unveiling culture.’ Instead of sitting outside, it has often sat 
consciously at its apex. Rather than model freedom from the law, it has also 
been the law. ‘Follow me’ to the scapegoats in the gospel can never be bound-
aried by institutionalised Christianity. The most powerful hypocrisy in western 
society is always the Christian Church because it is judged from within. Chris-
tianity, precisely as a katechon, but in contrast to Schmitt, inevitably corrodes 
from the head down, saved only by a final conviction that life itself depends on 
forgiveness.
None of this resolves Milosz’s plausibility crisis. And for as long as we 
remain within the world of ‘the political,’ Jesus always remains at best implau-
sible and at worst inexplicable. But the biblical pattern is always to await the 
‘miraculous,’ which throughout the Bible and in contrast to magic is always 
the unanticipated concrete irruption of the culturally unexpected, precisely 
because it does not reflect the closed pattern of mimetic cause and effect. 
Change outside the parameters of culture is only as implausible as feeding 
5,000, opening the Red Sea or walking on the water.
From the perspective of the gospels, all real change is mimetic, not cognitive, 
and in a new mimetic relationship all things are possible. The mistake is always 
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to seek salvation, and to reason within (closed) cognitive certainty rather than to 
seek and find (open) mimetic relationship. Likewise, the only transformative 
change is a mimetic one. Everything else is simply moving the furniture.
Because this is change which takes its reference from outside politics, it 
also refuses categorisation as an ‘anti- political’ project, precisely because such 
categorisations simply replicate the pattern of friend and foe. The injunction to 
render unto Caesar is also an injunction not to rival with the political, while not 
giving licence to Caesar for sacrificial behaviour. Jesus does exhort his listeners 
to destroy the system but reminds everyone of their mimetic choices in a shift 
from a cognitive question to a mimetic response. Only when we understand 
the dynamics of mimetic desire in relationships, can we grasp how the gospels 
identifies those outside the mimetic rivalry as the blessed: theirs is the kingdom 
of heaven, they will be comforted, they will inherit the earth, they will be filled, 
they will be shown mercy, they will see God, they will be called children of God.
‘PEACE- BUILDING’ IN A WORLD OF UNDIFFERENTIATION
For Girard in his final work, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin becomes a central 
model. Locked in his tower in Tuebingen, Hölderlin withdrew from the politi-
cal and social crisis around him, in contrast to the other intellectual ‘giants’ of 
his age. But Girard sees in Hölderlin a kind of intellectual hero, who grasped 
above all that only by withdrawal was it possible to avoid being pulled in by the 
mimetic vortex and to ‘refuse revenge’ (refuser la revanche).
But perhaps even Girard remains too cognitive. To ‘refuse revenge’ is not 
an autonomous intellectual act but a mimetic miracle, only available to us in 
mimesis with a model in whom revenge already does not exist. ‘To refuse’ 
is itself always given, or in more theological language, appears in the world 
as grace. The physical act of ‘going into a room and closing the door ‘remains 
secondary to the essential mimetic withdrawal from fascination with rivalry. 
Ultimately, the peacemakers are those who are enabled to be in the world (to be 
in the midst of the mimetic vortex) and to remain outside of the maelstrom. In 
mimesis, the choice is to be in the orbit of a model in whom revenge ‘is not’: and 
through whom refusal of revenge becomes a reality in the world.
In mimesis, however, the primary active step is not insisting on refusal, 
which ultimately remains within the cultural frame of control and sacrifice, but 
seeking and following a model of forgiveness. That model is inevitably the vic-
tim. In the Christian orbit that ultimately always returns to Jesus, as the ‘saviour 
of the world.’
msu-contagion27-all.indd   35 4/29/20   2:25 PM
36 Duncan John Morrow
In a world in which politics is no longer decisive, all genuine peacebuild-
ing is therefore primarily mimetic and primarily relational. Among Girard’s 
decisive contributions to thinking about violence, conflict and peace are his 
insistence on the existential nature of the question of violence and his location 
of the question of human violence in anthropology rather than politics. Poli-
tics is neither the cause nor the answer to conflict but a cultural mechanism to 
manage a bigger question of violence rooted in mimetic rivalry. This apocalypse 
of politics underlying Girardian thought is that culture can no longer control 
the violence unleashed in undifferentiation. Critically, as the crisis is a crisis of 
extreme mimeticism, only a response rooted in the reality of mimetic relation-
ships offers any prospect. All real change is mimetic, not cognitive. The only 
change that matters is a mimetic one. With whom/what are we mimetic? It is 
always ‘foolishness to Greeks’.
In the real world, Girard represents a revolution. By recasting all talk of 
violence and conflict as a mimetic rather than a cognitive phenomenon, he reori-
entates all study of peace and ‘peace building’ away from politics to the quality 
of relationships, and away from the language of politics as totality towards the 
language of infinite human service and interaction. All work and talk about ‘cre-
ating peace,’ bringing ‘injustice’ to an end or arresting the spiral of revenge for 
the past which threatens to consume the future must now be reconsidered from 
here. Everything else is revealed as part of the escalation to the extremes and the 
crisis of undifferentiation. It is nothing less than a transcendence of realpolitik 
by the washing of human feet.
And we are on the most fragile of ground. Spoken in the wrong way, the 
claim that a way through the crisis of undifferentiation depends on a conversion 
to Jesus as forgiving victim itself runs the risk of merely fuelling the escalation 
it purports to address, by bringing a world steeped in Christian religiosity into 
deeper rivalry and causing instant scandal, both to secular and religions across 
the globe. But this cannot be the proclamation of ‘Christianity’ but the proc-
lamation of the forgiveness of the victim in which there are no enemies, and 
which many people in many cultures and religions have been seeking since the 
foundations of the world, even as Jesus may be its most complete revelation 
(Goodhart27).
Decisively, Jesus in the gospels moves from preaching to silence, and from 
engagement to dying. It is a move from telling to showing or revealing, from the 
cognitive to the mimetic. In relation to the Jewish people Jesus ‘incarnates;’ and 
thus fulfils, the law. It is now the only way in which it can be proclaimed.
The translation of Girard’s theory into the real world is therefore fraught 
with traps. As an instrumental tool, mimetic theory dissolves into the same 
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religious moralism which it seeks to escape. Girard himself was therefore always 
rightly concerned that an anthropological insight would be reduced again to a 
political tool.
Yet from a lens of mimetic theory, politics, like violence, cannot be 
‘overcome’ only transformed in relationships. After the end of the Cold War 
the United Nations came under increasing pressure to expand its role from 
military peacekeeping, once itself a novel idea. In 1992, Boutros Boutros Ghali 
announced an ‘Agenda for Peace’ expanded into a comprehensive approach to 
include a commitment to ‘Peace- keeping, Peace- making and Peace- building’ 
along lines proposed by a Norwegian theorist Johann Galtung. Agenda for 
Peace shifted attention towards direct intervention in the structures of states 
and politics and the engagement of local communities. It also introduced a 
new distinction into the language of international stabilisation between what 
was called ‘negative peace’ defined by the absence of overt killing, and ‘posi-
tive peace ‘which focussed on the quality of relationships. Yet thirty years later, 
international peacebuilding faces accusations that it is little more than a new 
form of patronising liberal imperialism. What began as an acknowledgement of 
the depth of human violence, is now itself accused of being part of it.
The practical question is still: what does freedom from mimetic desire look 
like. But now, we are forced to move away from grand designs to steps, from 
the romantic to the romanesque, from formulae to parables. Peace- making in 
the global village is as much about taking steps and finding others as strategic 
plans. In every case it is about moving from the cognitive into the mimetic, from 
‘dialogue’ to ‘meeting.’
Reconciliation is only possible if those doing it live out of forgiveness. The place 
of the victim is not the place of moralism but a chance for contrition. To forgive 
now means that the things that were between us, the things done and not done 
consciously and unknown, have no consequences for our relationship— for how 
we are together. We are no longer in mimetic rivalry with one another, trying to 
retaliate or win. In this spirit we give and receive from one another. This is far 
beyond good will where we use others to be good. The triumph of the victim 
becomes an opening up for us, the also violent, to return to humanity. The expo-
sure of prejudice (pre- judgement) is no longer a matter of shame, but a chance 
for release from myth (Kaptein, 199128).
In practice, it is not about attacking or setting aside the remnants of politi-
cal order but of transforming and calling them to a human purpose. Everything 
human must have shape, only now in mimesis with forgiveness we know that 
the law is death. What remains of the political now is reconfigured to serve the 
community of friends, and to constantly face its failures. Political leaders, and 
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all those in visible positions, have huge possibilities for mimetic good or evil. 
And our rituals should be designed as sacrament not sacrifice. But in every case, 
movement means mimetic contrast but not cognitive ‘counter.’ Unexpectedly, 
difference expands rather than contracts.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The crises of Northern Ireland and Brexit are not exceptional, but evidence of the 
crisis of undifferentiation which Girard illuminates, although the example of 
Northern Ireland as a small and mostly hidden precursor of the wider crisis sug-
gests that politics in Schmitt’s sense of friend and foe no longer offers anything 
other than more violence. Instead, our future depends entirely on decisions to 
seek transformed relationships in which the present objects of desire are no 
longer the core of mimetic rivalry.
In the context of my own journey with the question of violence and peace 
in Northern Ireland, I want to conclude by pointing to critical figures in my 
own life. The first is the figure of Ray Davey, a relatively unknown Irish prot-
estant minister but the founder of the ecumenical community of which I am a 
member. As a young man, he found himself an inexperienced pastor to other 
prisoners of war in camps near Dresden. It was his highly unusual experience 
both to have direct contact with civilian Germans and to be a British soldier on 
the ground near Dresden in February 1945. Having witnessed the cataclysmic 
aerial bombings of his prison- city, it is now clear to me that Davey witnessed 
what Girard describes: the end of war and politics as a route through human 
violence. There simply is no escalation beyond Dresden without extinction. He 
also saw, that, however, flimsily, only a radically other relationship offered any 
exit from the frenzy. And it is to that apocalypse that I owe my own experience.
The second, in this year when he died, is the French- Canadian founder of 
the L’Arche Community, Jean Vanier. Vanier spent his life living out of his expe-
rience of community with people with profound learning disabilities. He wrote 
often about these experiences, but three of his insights seem to me to offer a 
way to conclude. “The belly laugh” he said: is the best way to evacuate anguish.” 
More directly he directed us to “Stop looking for peace. Give yourselves where 
you are. Stop looking at yourselves and look at your brothers and sisters in need. 
Ask yourself how you can better love your brothers and sister and then you 
will find peace.”29 And finally: “Each human being, however small or weak has 
something to bring to humanity. As we start to really get to know others, as 
we begin to listen to each other’s stories, things begin to change. We begin the 
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movement from exclusion to inclusion, from fear to trust, from closedness to 
openness, from judgement and prejudice to forgiveness and understanding. It 
is a movement of the heart.”30
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